Efectos de la comunicación del banco central sobre el desacuerdo en las expectativas de la tasa de política monetaria: evidencias para Colombia

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es investigar los efectos de la comunicación del banco central en la formación
del pronóstico de la tasa de interés de política monetaria.
Para ello, es utilizado como estudio de caso la economía colombiana para el periodo 2014-2020. La metodología empleada consiste en evaluar los efectos de la información
suministrada en las minutas, el volumen de noticias y las publicaciones del banco central sobre los desacuerdos en las expectativas del mercado financiero. Por medio de regresiones econométricas, y utilizando el método GMM y la metodología VAR de impulso-respuesta, se encuentra que las decisiones de política que se realizan en consenso, así como la claridad en la redacción de las minutas, tienen la capacidad de reducir las discrepancias entre los agentes.

Palabras clave:

desacuerdos comunicación política monetaria expectativas de tasa de interés Banco Central Colombia Econometría

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