Cómo citar
Lagos Cortés , D., & Roncancio Rachid , R. (2021). Independencia de la junta directiva y desempeño financiero: evidencia de empresas colombianas. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica, 13(1). https://doi.org/10.14718/revfinanzpolitecon.v13.n1.2021.8

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la relación entre la independencia de la junta directiva y el desempeño financiero (variables ROA, ROE y Q de Tobin). Se usaron dos perspectivas de independencia: por un lado, la Ley 964 de 2005, obligatoria en el mercado de valores colombiano; por otro, una perspectiva ampliada que incluyó relaciones de negocios (directorios cruzados, antigüedad), relaciones financieras (paquetes de compensación, participación en la propiedad) y relaciones personales (fundadores, miembros de la familia propietaria) como factores que limitan la independencia. Se usaron modelos de regresión (efectos aleatorios) en un panel de datos no balanceado compuesto por 69 empresas de la Bolsa de Valores de Colombia. Los resultados mostraron que una definición de independencia más rigurosa es apreciada mejor por el mercado. En específico, se encontró que la independencia de la junta directiva no afecta el desempeño contable (ROA y ROE), pero sí el desempeño en el mercado (Q de Tobin).  

Licencia

Derechos de autor 2021 Diógenes Lagos Cortés

Creative Commons License
Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.

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