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Abstract
The ideological orientation of governments, the timing of elections and the particular interests of the politicians can affect importantly the economic policy in any of its components. It is possible that a government establishes its economic policies either following the ideological orientation of the party which it belongs to or “handling” the economy to stay in the power. The timing of elections could determine the economic turn according to the voter’s decision. If they decide not to support the incumbent, it brings out a substitution in the policymaker and a change in the economic outcome, in other words there is a political cycle. Based in annual data at the national level during the 20th century this investigation pretends to look for the existence of opportunistic or partisan political cycles on the total public debt and its basic components, as well as high-powered money.
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