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Abstract
This research presents a controlled experiment that aims to analyze taxpayers’ behavior to determine in which cases rewards or punishments promote taxes payment. In this first approach, a population of Argentinian university students was analyzed. Three groups were designed where tax compliance is simulated with different probabilities of being audited and different rewards, probabilistic or true, to the fiscal compliance cases. Results suggest that some incentives to tax payment could be more effective than punishments. Consequences of the tax policy, which result from the corollaries of the suggested experiment, are also explained.
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