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Abstract
This article models the potential effects of firm mergers on the price of a market for homogenous goods. The analysis is carried out according to two scenarios: a) firms have similar levels of technology at their disposal and b) a degree of heterogeneity is assumed between groups of firms. It is found that even when mechanisms are in place to favor efficiency in product supply, there is a risk that prices will increase.
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